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For a short period during the 1970s Norway was among the ten most 
important weapon exporters in the world,1 largely as a result of the sale of 
Penguin missiles from Kongsberg Viipcnfabrikk (KV). This stale of affairs 
is relatively new to Norway and to the state owned KY. Until the late 
1950s practically the only Norwegian weapons sold abroad was the Krag-
J0rgensen rifle. The development of the anti-submarine weapon Terne 
was an important step in the modernization of the Norwegian weapons 
industry. 
This article is about the development of Terne at the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) and at KY. My focus is 
administrative and organizational - not technical. The weapons system 
was developed without any pressure from «the outside world». Nobody 
ever asked the NDRE to develop this weapon. Consequently much of the 
development work at the NDRE consisted of the raising of funds and 
goodwill. And the researchers were successful in their task; in the very 
beginning not even the Navy wanted the Norwegian anti-submarine 
weapon. Ten years later, there were strong advocates for the weapon in the 
Starting (Parliament), in the Defence Department, in NATO and in parts of 
the US bureaucracy. 
I have chosen the decision-making process as the most interesting 
aspect of the Terne development. Yet, Terne was also important in many 
other ways. Both at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(NDRE) and at Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk (KV) the Terne project was 
succeeded by other more well-known projects, for instance, the Penguin 
missile system. The director at KY, Bjarne Hurlen, once described the 
Terne project as a «crowbar» far the company.' In a speech in 1980, 
Hurlen mentioned the new process thinking that was introduced as a result 
of Terne, being instrumental in contributing to the fundamental revival of 
KY..1 
At the NDRE the Terne project also introduced a new way of thinking 
and working. The project was so big as to necessitate a hitherto unpre-
cedented level of cooperation between the different departments in the 
Establishment. The NDRE staff also gained experience in project 
management with Terne. Last, but not least, the Terne system introduced 
much new technology. Both KV and the NDRE acquired competence in 
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the field of electronics. The weapons system consisted of advanced sonars, 
fuses and computers. The people developing and producing Terne 
acquired skills that were to be essential in the making of other products 
when the Terne project was finished. 
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Terne and the NDRE 
The most obvious reason for the development of a new weapons system is 
that there is a need for the weapon. At the start of the cold war there was a 
need for practically all kinds of weapons. The anti-submarine weapons 
developed and used during the "war were no longer of adequate quality. 
The hit probability was below IS per cent and the weapons systems were 
also too heavy for the relatively small Norwegian naval vessels. As a 
response to the technological challenge, and in particular the political 
challenges, the Storting granted an additional NOK 100 million to defence 
in March 1948. From 1950 to 1954 the defence budget was more than 
doubled in response to international developments.4 
In spite of these facts, neither Navy ofticers nor officials in the Ministry 
of Defence asked the NDRE to develop an anti-submarine weapons 
system. In the first couple of years after the war the Norwegian govern-
ment did not want to purchase weapons because civilian needs were 
greater. From 1949 and throughout most of the fifties Norway got most of 
the weapons it needed from the United States (Military Assistance Pro-
gram). As long as the Norwegian Ministry of Defence did not buy 
Norwegian equipment it was unlikely that Norwegian weapons would be 
developed. The reason why Terne was developed is therefore to bc found 
inside the NDRE. The researchers at the NDRE made an independent 
decision to develop the Terne project. The remaining part of this chapter is 
therefore devoted to the process of decision making within the NDRE. 
When asked in January 1954, the director of the NDRE, Fredrik M!')ller, 
did not remember who had initiated Terne. He recalled a meeting with one 
of the branches of the Navy before 21 February 1950 where the Terne 
project was discussed. He recalled in particular that «the main object of 
the discussion was which branch of the Navy should be in charge of the 
new weapon.» He remembered well the conclusion: «The Artillery should 
be in charge of the missile when it was in the air and then the Torpedo and 
Mine service should take over when the missile hit the water."S 
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It is possible to determine the age of the Terne weapon in at least two 
ways. The weapons system that was to be installed on naval vessels dates 
back to the early 1950s, but the work on the first projects leading up to the 
Terne system began in 1947. 
The lirst of these projects waS a rocket-driven diving mine called Terne 
I. 100 such rockets were produced and used in various tests. The tech-
nology very much resembled that used in the later Terne systems." 
The NDRE department in charge of Asdic (the original name of sonars 
named after the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee 
which developed the sonars during the war) started up after the war on a 
project to develop sonarS for securing the harbours. In all 19 stationary 
harbour sonars were made in the late 19405.7 
The combination of the harbour sonars and Terne I produced Terne 11; a 
weapons system for use against submarines attacking harbours. It is 
unclear how the idea of Terne 11 originated. The «normal" procedure 
would probably have been that the potential user of the weapon (the Coast 
Guard or the Navy) asked for the weapon and then defined requirements 
and specifications. In our case it was the NDRE which defined the 
specifications of Terne 1I and the Navy corrected the specifications in 
December 1950.' It appears that the initative lay mostly with the 
researchers at the NDRE. Even though the Navy corrected the specifi-
cations for the. weapons system, these corrections were not essential. 
Terne n was the first weapons system developed at the NDRE. It 
became the largest project at the NDRE in the early 1950s.' It was 
important for the Establishment because it necessitated cooperation 
between different departments inside the NDRE, because it was a purely 
military project and linally, because the NDRE had to acquire knowledge 
about servomechanisms. 1O A servo system means that there are at least 
two independent parts which constantly influence each other. In this case, 
a computer constantly changed the position of the weapon based on 
information from the sonars. Terne Il was never fully completed. I shall 
discuss the failure to complete the project later; at this stage we simply 
make note of the fact that one of the reasons was that Terne III emerged as 
a bigger, more prestigious and more important project at the NDRE. 
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The official starting date for the Terne III project is 3 January 1953. That 
day the steering committee for the Terne II project decided that the NDRE 
should start the preparations for Terne Ill. In the minutes from this 
meeting there are no explanations as to why the steering committee 
decided to start the new project. The only thing mentioned is that the 
undertaking of the Terne III project should not cost more. The develop-
ment of Terne II should continue and the money already granted for this 
project should also cover the development of Terne Ill. At this stage the 
decision-makers regarded Terne III as a natural successor of Terne n. 
After trials with Terne 11 in Vestergapet (close to Kristiansand in the 
southern pan of Norway) the researchers wrote that «because all the parts 
in the weapon are so light, there should be nothing to prevent us from 
putting the system on board even very small vessels.,," 
The first in-depth discussion of the true Terne project was in the spring 
of 1953. The discussion concentrated on the priority to be attached to 
Terne 1II at the expense of Terne 11. Erik Klippenberg (then researcher in 
the Physics department of the NDRE) discussed in a report of April that 
year the continuation of work on Terne. 11 He gave the steering committee 
tl1ree options: 
«a) The work on Terne III continues at full capacity. Nothing more is to 
be done with Terne n until the Navy has taken a decision about the 
harbour defence installation. 
b) The Terne 11 development is discontinued pending the decision of the 
Navy. The Terne III work continues at full capacity, but the NDRE is 
aiming to install the system in even smaller vessels than the proposed 
Sleipner-dass. In that way ( .. we .. ) utilise fully Terne's light weight 
and the vessel can serve as a mobile defence system for the harbours 
and can supplement the stationary systems in the important harbours 
and replace them in harbours where it is too costly or inconvenient to 
install Terne n. 
c) The NDRE and the Coast Guard are cooperating in making the 
harbour defence ~yslt:m in Kristiansand operational as soon as 
possible. Work on Terne III continues to the extent allowed by the 
development of Terne H.» 
9 
Klippenberg was in favour of the third proposal. His main argument was 
that this solution made it possible for some of the systems to be 
operational pretty soon. «Given the mood within the Navy, this ought to be 
an important consideration.» Klippenberg also argued that the develop-
ment of Terne III would be more time-consuming and expensive than 
originally planned. 
The steering committee for Terne 1I accepted Klippcnbcrg's advice, but 
it also decided to let three researchers (Klippenberg, Thorvald Gerhardsen 
and Thomas Krogh) examine the need for Terne III. This study, on the 
needs and requirements for a shipborne Terne II was to be «presented to 
the Navy before the Establishment starts building the prototype».13 The 
group of three realized early on that it was necessary to study thoroughly 
the requirements for the development of Terne Ill. The study was therefore 
accorded high priority.14 In other words the NDRE decided to single out 
both Terne 11 and Terne III as high priority projects. Today, this may seem 
to be a contradiction, but it would appear that the NDRE at the time did 
not perceive any such contradiction. Anyway, the priority question was 
solved in the summer of 1954. But it was not the NDRE alone which took 
the decision. As will be shown later, unexpected financial aid from the U.S. 
crucially influenced the decision by the NDRE. 
An important part of the study made by the three researchers was the 
assessmem of the already existing anti-submarine (A/S) weapons. The 
conclusion was clear: «For ships which are too small to be fitted with 
Squid (British anti-submarine weapon ed.) and for ships with A/S work as 
a secondary duty, no satisfactory solution has been found in existing 
shipborne A/S weapons. It is the opinion of this Establishment that the 
speci!ic problems of modernizing the A/S installations in the Norwegian 
Navy can only be solved through a program for new construction of 
equipment.» 15 
The assessment of the work required was modest: between 15 and 20 
researchers were required for 2 or 2 1/2 years. In addition to the normal 
budget of the NDRE the researchers asked for an additional NOK 1 
million. The administration at the Establishment was basically satisfied 
with the study and it sent a formal proposal to the Navy. The assistant 
director, Danielsen, wanted, however, an even better documentation of the 
need for a new weapons system. «To justify for ourselves the undertaking 
of such a great task and to have a basis for asking for funds from others, 
there must be an assessment of our possibilities of acquiring the weapons 
needed from abroad.» 
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The Chief of the Navy and his staff discussed the proposal from the 
NDRE in a meeting on 4 May 1954. It was decided to establish a 
«building committee» and Thorvald Gerhardsen was appointed leader of 
the project. Gerhardsen resigned as project leader in the summer of 1955 
because he did not agree with the head of the NDRE on «several 
questions» concerning the development of the project. 16 Apart from these 
problems it seems that Terne III was developed without any great 
problems from the summer of 1954 until the turn of the year 1956/57. 
The shaping off NOIRE 
Most of the employees at the NDRE had been engaged in military 
research for the allies during the war.17 Many of them had done their 
research in electronics and sonars. The Terne development was therefore a 
«natural» continuation of the wartime research for some of the people at 
the NDRE. But the researchers had many options after the war and in at 
least two ways the Terne projects were not «natural» projects for the 
Establishment: 
1. Terne was purely military. 
2. Terne was a larger and more complex project than was usual in Nor-
way. 
One of the established goals for the NDRE when it was set up was that the 
work done at the Establishment should also benefit civilian society. The 
director, Fredrik M011er, emphasized that the employees «should not only 
work for singularily destructive ends.» 18 When the organization of the 
Establishment was mapped out, many of the researchers wanted it to be 
like a University some of them even wanted a principal or a dean. M011er 
once recalled that the Minister of Defence, Jens Christian Hauge, was the 
one who decided that the NDRE should have a purely military or 
industrial organization,I9 
Even though the NDRE spent much time arguing the case for the Teme 
projects, no one ever suggested that these weapons systems would benefit 
civilian research or industry. The advocates of Terne thought of them as 
purely military projects. The most obvious reason is that international 
tension and the developing cold war convinced the researchers that 
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military research was an urgent priority. The feeling that military research 
was becoming more and more important was so obvious to the researchers 
at the NDRE that they did not even write it down. Finn 0rstavik in his 
study of the NDRE emphasises the war background of most of the 
employees.") Most of them had been actively t1ghting to win the war -
now they continued fighting just as hard to win the peace. To defend and 
develop Norway was more important than anything c1se. Because of this 
altitude within a military structure, it is likely that the people at NDRE felt 
that pure military research waS the only possibility. 
The researchers who wanted to do more science or who wanted to do 
research with possible civilian spin-off, disappeared after a while from 
Kjeller and Hortell where the Terne projects were carried out. A more 
homogeneous staff contributed, of course, also to a purification of the 
work and the goals. 
Why then develop such a big project as Terne? Finn Lied, director for 
many years at the NDRE, has written that Terne showed «that we were 
able to do something «big». We became a large institute carrying out large 
projects in contrast to so many other institutes in this country which 
became large for so many small projects.') Until then, researchers in 
Norway had been looked upon as «lonely eccentrics,» according to Gun-
nar Randers." He was one of the researchers at the NDRE who started 
«thinking big». His nuclear reactor research was removed from the NDRE 
for political reasons,23 but he waS among the three most important 
founders of the NDRE. He himself wanted to move to the US after the war 
because the conditions for research in Norway were, in his opinion, very 
poor. Having received relatively large grants from the Ministry of Defence 
he decided to stay in Norway and to build the tlrst nuclear reactor in any 
small country. 
Randers and his friends at the NDRE possessed a fair amount of self-
cont1dence. They had been affiliated to some of the most well-known 
research institutes in the world. Moreover, they and their fellow 
researchers abroad had shown that military research was of great 
importance during World War n. Sonar, radar and the nuclear bomb were 
only some of the results of wartime research. 
The war changed the mentality of the researchers and they got more 
money from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Of significance is also 
the fact that technological development made larger projects necessary. 
Weapons systems and nuclear reactors were complicated systems -
consisting of many components and techniques. 
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Today Finn Lied argues that the Teme project started an integration 
process at the NDRE." It might be the case that this integration was one 
of the intentions of the people responsible for the Terne projects. During 
the first ten years after the war the administration of the NDRE was weak 
and the departments pursued their own interests. The first leader of the 
Terne project, Gerhardsen, complained in 1954 that the administration of 
the NDRE did not express clear priorities and only took a point of view 
when it was forced to do so by sharp conflicts between the departments." 
The d'isintegration was obviously a problem for others besides 
Gerhardsen, but the need for a more united Establishment is never cited as 
a reason for the development of the Teme project. 
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The Navy knew after World War II that existing anti-submarine weapons 
were not good enough. The Asdic and Radar Inspection notified the Navy 
Headquarters of the need for new anti-submarine weapons in 1949 but the 
work at the NDRE was not mentioned in this notification." It is not fair to 
deal with the Navy as a single institutional actor; the attitudes towards the 
NDRE were different in the different branches of the Navy. In general it is 
fair to say that there was a cultural conflict between the older Navy 
officers and the young researchers at the NDRE. "The advanced and 
independent pOSition that is given the Defence Research Establishment 
within the Armed Forces can result in the armed services being force-fed 
with weapons whose value in a military respect does not correspond to the 
expense involved.»" This quotation from the Mine Service in the Navy 
illustrates an attitude towards the NDRE that most Navy officers retained 
until the late fifties. 
Two other examples should be mentioned. The first concerns the Terne 
II project. One of the reasons why this project was never completed was a 
Jack of confidence in the NDRE on the part of the Navy. After the first 
trials with Terne II in Kristiansand the researchers considered the weapons 
system nearly finished. [n fact the fuses were too poor and the sonars did 
not measure the depth of an approaching submarine.28 But the people at 
the NDRE felt that these were minor problems, and they expected to solve 
them during the production period. This attitude - that a weapons system 
waS good enough for production even if it did not work - provoked Navy 
officers. The assistant director at the NDRE, Reidar Danielsen, was aware 
of this problem. In July 1954, he argued for the completion of Terne II 
before any work started on Terne 1Il. It is important «both inside the 
Establishment and to the outside world to show that we can accomplish a 
task,» Danielsen wrote. 29 
The other example dates back to the fall of 1954. The leaders of the 
Terne project had - together with Navy officers - discussed the concept of 
the new weapons system with British experts in the Admiralty. The British 
were not impressed. Both the calculations of hit probability and the 
estimates of weight were disputed. The officer in charge of the Torpedo 
service, Bj0rn Erling Ytterhorn, promptly asked the Navy Headquarters to 
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stop «spending money, time and manpower on the project Terne IlL One 
should instead concentrate all efforts on the superior and completed 
weapon Squid (British anti-submarine weapon ed.).»3o This was after the 
Navy'S formal approval of the Terne project, and Ytterhorn himself had 
participated in the first steering committee meetings. More than anything 
else, it shows that the original support of the Navy was only formal and 
superficiaL 
In the coming years the Navy became more and more devoted to the 
Terne project - and to a certain extent to the NDRE. During 1955 and 
early 1956 the building committee (which was now the steering 
committee for the Teme project) was enlarged with three Navy officers. It 
is not documented why the committee was expanded - nevertheless the 
result was that the Teme project was given more profound and broader 
support. It was particularly important that Commodore Knut Blich 
became a member. He was in charge of the technical department in the 
Navy Headquarters and was part of the Navy leadership. He had a genuine 
interest in all aspects of the Teme project. He was the one who complained 
about the lack ofleadership in the steering committee. After Gerhardsen's 
resignation it took more than one and a half years before his successor 
took over.'1 During this period the administration of the NDRE took care 
of the project itself. Blich and the officer in charge of the Asdic service, 
Commander Jens Seie, became such strong supporters of Tcrnc that they 
themselves worked actively to gather support for Teme outside the Navy. 
Why did the Navy soften? There is one, predominant answer; the Navy 
did not pay very much for the weapon development at the NDRE. Two 
days before the building committee was established (4 May 1954) it was 
clear that the U.S. was willing to sponsor much of the project. The NDRE 
asked for NOK 200,000 - assistance from naval ships and «an active 
interest» when they formally asked for support from the Navy in March 
1954.32 At this time the Navy had the power to veto the project. One of the 
conditions for the U.S. support was that the Navy wanted the weapon. The 
Navy had for many years complained because they felt t~he other 
services got more money from the Ministry of Defence. It would have 
been more than strange if they refused to support the development of a 
weapon they needed as long as most of the development costs would be 
covered by others. 
As the Terne system developed, the Navy became more and more 
committed to the project. Sustained financial and moral support from the 
Americans was obviously important but I will also argue that the 
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incorporation of the Navy officers in -the steering committee generated 
enthusiasm among those involved. The Navy started sharing responsibility 
for the Terne project. 
16 
Teme and the Americans 
American financial and moral support was a prerequisite for the develop-
ment and the production of Terne. The director of the NDRE, Finn Lied, 
said in 1958 that the Terne project would not have been completed had it 
not been for lhe Americans}] When the Minister of Defence briefed the 
Government on the Terne project in January 1959 he said that «if the 
production costs were to be met within the limits of the defence budget, it 
would not be justifiable from a military point of view to stake such large 
amounts on this project.;,3-t 
These quotations can be verified by the fact that the budget of the 
NDRE was small in comparison to the total cost of the Terne develop-
ment. In 1954/55 it was a little over NOK 5 million, whereas the first 
grant from the US to the Terne project amounted to NOK 2,3 million. 
I have already mentioned that the Norwegian military in the tifties got 
most of their weapons from the US and against that background it is 
unlikely that the Ministry of Defence would have given extra grants to the 
Terne development. 
It is also worth mentioning that the Norwegian Government never 
granted Research and Development contracts. "It is unfortunate that 
Norwegian industry is without the encouragement and the direct State 
support that our competitors abroad have benelitted tram for genera-
tions,» the director of KY, Bjarne Hurlen, wrote in 1966.35 During the 
lifties it was a rule that Government offices should buy Norwegian 
products if the price was less than 10 per cent more than the cheapest 
foreign produc!.](' Most leaders of industry found this rule inadequate and 
they asked for a more gene rollS policy. "The big State companies, which 
through insight and understanding, ought to lead in the development (of 
the electronics industry ed.> don't do it,>' it was stated in a report from the 
Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) 
in 1963,17 Clearly, leaders of industry complained becausc they wanted 
more money, yet there is no doubt that Norway was without a general 
technology development policy that could have benefitted the Teme 
project. 
A few words about the American support system is necessary. The 
Mutual Weapons Development Program (MWDP) was a minor part of the 
total U.S. programme of extending weapons and money to Europe during 
the lifties.ln all, Norway received 47 per cent of her defence equipment in 
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the period from 1951 to 1967 in the form of direct aid. The weapon aid in 
this period amounted to NOK 6,3 billion." The size of the MWDP is more 
uncertain, but until the beginning of the sixties, the NDRE received NOK 
35 million.l" 
App~icati@ns for Deve~@pment 
and Production Support 
The NDRE presented their projects to the Americans for the first time on 
10 December 1953. It was the director of the NDRE who contacted the 
American Embassy in Oslo (the Military Assistance Advisory Group, 
MAAG) after he had heard some rumourS about the new assistance 
program. In connection with the presentation of the Terne project, the 
NDRE applied officially for American support to the Terne project and 
another project - «Engsmelle» (an electromagnetic fuse for 81" bom-
bers).'" The Americans needed four months to make the decision, but on 2 
May 1954, the NDRE was notified that the U.S. wanted to sponsor the 
«completion>, of Terne with NOK 1,400.000." Terne was at this stage far 
from completion, but the NDRE gave the impression that the Terne 
project was more mature than it actually was since that was one of the 
conditions for the MWDP support." The MWDP also supported the 
Engsmelle project. The agreement was signed on 31 May. 
Developing the system was both more time-consuming and more 
expensive than expected in the first contract. In the fan of 1955 the NDRE 
applied for more money and extended time limits. An increase in 
employment and materiel costs combined with insufficient capacity in the 
workshop were cited as the main reasons for the new application." 
The Mutual Weapons Development Team (MWDT), which was in 
charge of the MWDP, gave a positive reply but they were not completely 
satisfied with the Norwegian application. ,dl)t would be helpful if you 
would submit more concrete infonnation, particularly with respect to the 
increase in development costs, .. Our own analysis of the progress reports 
which you have submitted on Terne III suggests that the increase in 
development costs are mainly attributable to important design modifica-
tions which have been made in the course of the development work, and 
which will result in a weapons system which is much improved over the 
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one originally planned.» MWDT further suggested five possible improve-
ments of the Terne system. They asked the NDRE to write a new 
application." 
In other words, the MWDT actually prepared much of the application 
for the Norwegians. In the next and final application from the NDRE it 
was stated that the extra costs and the delay were «mainly caused by 
important design modifications being made during the course uf the 
development work. These modifications will, however, result in a weapons 
system materially improved over the one originally planned, and it is felt 
that the improvement is of sufficient magnitude to fully justify the delay 
that is now becoming apparent.»" Two months later the Americans 
accepted the delays and granted an additional USD 143,000 to the Terne 
project.'6 
There is no doubt that the Terne system at this time was better than the 
one planned in 1954. Some of the «improvements» were at the same time 
necessary changes to the original plans submitted in 1954. 
Even though the MWDP paid for the development of Terne, it was not 
obvious that the Americans should pay for the production of the weapon. 
In the beginning of 1957 there were signs that a foreign country wanted to 
buy three Terne weapons." The documentation does not indicate whether 
the country in question was the U.s., nor does it refer to the manner of 
payment. At the end of 1957 the NDRE asked KY and another sonar 
equipment company (SIMRAD) to work out a price for the production of 
Terne - it was implied that the U.S. wanted to pay for the production.'8 
It is not clear why the NDRE contacted KY and SIMRAD at the end of 
1957. In January 1958, the deputy-chairman of the board at KY, Jens 
Christian Hauge, met the leader for the MWDT, General Larkin, in Paris 
and told him that Norway intended to apply for support for the pilot 
production of three Terne weapons. Larkin promised Hauge to support 
the application if it was possible within the terms of reference for 
the MWDP. The difficulty was that the MWDP supported only the 
development, not the production, of new weapons and equipment. Hauge 
concluded in his report after the meeting that although the MWDT was in 
favour of supporting the production «It is not possible to say how far he 
(Larkin ed.) can go. Under all circumstances the decision must be taken in 
Washington.»4" Hauge's report after the meeting gives the impression that 
the NDRE took the initiative and that MWDT did not know about the 
application which was being prepared. At the same time we know that 
American support was one of the conditions for contracting work the 
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month before. The most likely explanation is that the Americans had 
vaguely promised to pay for parts of the production. The NDRE therefore 
immediately initiated the contracting work and began to raise money. 
General Larkin came to Norway in the beginning of February. The 
report after the meeting illustrates how the MWDT and the NDRE 
cooperated in the process of preparing the application. We «wish to find a 
pattern for the project which enahles the Americans to pay for the making 
of three complete weapons that can be used in trials,» Lied wrote.5I) Lied 
emphasized that it was important to give the impression that Norway 
would cover as much as possible of the production costs. The MWDT 
«accepts, however, that we should include the Navy's total expenses for 
the installation and the running of the ships during trials.» Lied also wrote 
that the MWDT should go through a draft of the application before it was 
finally written. 
In the final application the NDRE stressed the fact that the Terne 
weapons were to be produced for «engineering and preliminary evaluation 
tests.» The trials had revealed the necessity for «pre-production models». 
The NDRE argued that only when these models were finished would it be 
possible to furnish the test data which was required for the NATO 
authorities assessing the system. The Establishment applied for USD 
2.325 million from the U.S. In the application it was also estimated that 
with U .S. aid the Terne weapon would be installed and ready for use in 
1962; without U.S. backing it would be installed in 1965.51 
The NDRE director, Lied, went to Paris in person with the application. 
According to him, the MWDT was very pleased; "You have put forward a 
good case and we will act upon it,» Larkin said." Within a week the 
proposal was sent to Washington. More than six months later - in Novem-
ber 1958 - the NDRE sent a revised application to the MWDT.lt is likely 
that this revised proposal was necessary for formal reasons. The U.S. 
Government reacted promptly and within a month the Norwegian 
Government was presented with a contract.S3 
Finn Lied wrote in i.l resume of the contract that the American contri-
bution «could only be characterized as generous.»" In brief the contract 
implied that <dhe U.S. would pay for the production of the systems, while 
the Norwegian contribution would be covering the costs of the install a-
tion»,55 In addition a portion of the Navy's expenses for the running of 
three vessels, and wages to a group of technicians and researchers at the 
NDRE, were included as part of the Norwegian contribution. These con-
tributions «will not require any outlays exceeding the normal budgets, and 
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they were included so to say in accordance with the MWDP to show a 
reasonable sharing of the expenses between the two countries,» Lied 
wrote. 56 The contract was sanctioned by the Storting in the beginning of 
1959.57 
The U.S. contriibuted with more 
than money 
Looking back at the MWDP program in 1963, Fredrik M0ller wrote that 
financial support made it possible to complete the projects earlier than 
would otherwise have been the case. However, he went on, «what is more 
important is that the researchers at the NDRE through this support have 
had the feeling t ... ) that a superpower appreciates the results of their 
research and regards them as significant. This fact has probably also 
influenced our authorities and the armed forces.»5H 
Beyond doubt, American financial support was essential when the 
Terne project started. It must have been a relief for the researchers at the 
NDRE not to rely on a sceptical Norwegian Navy. Traditionally, the 
Norwegian military had relied upon advice and help from colleagues in 
Great Britan. Most of the researchers at the NDRE had been in Britain 
during the war. Consequently, when the Terne project was outlined, it was 
emphasized that cooperation with allies was important ror its develop-
ment. But the Admiralty was not interested in the Terne project in 1954, 
and the NDRE did not know where to seek support. Thorvald Gerhardsen 
asked for American professional support in July 1954, but his letter 
seemed to imply uncertainty about the American willingness to help; "Our 
information on available U.S. reports and equipment is very limited and 
consequently we do not know specifically what to ask for. In case anything 
can be made available to us we should like to list the subjects of most 
interest. Reports, handbooks, instructional manuals or any other 
information covering these items will be studied with great interest.» 
Gerhardsen then listed eleven technical lields of particular interest and he 
concluded the letter: "It is understood that the latest developments in some 
of these fields may be highly classified, thus preventing any exchange of 
information.»)59 
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Professional American assistance turned out to be more than originally 
asked for. In February 1955 three American experts participated in a 
three-day conference on the Terne project. hO One of the conditions for the 
MWDP support was also that the NDRE should prepare reports on the 
project every third or sixth month. These reports were studied by 
American experts and the NDRE knew that the project was being assessed 
by qualified people outside the country. 
One aspect was professional support in the development of Terne; even 
more important, however, were the efforts on the part of the U.S. to 
promote the sale of the Norwegian weapons system. The MWDT 
proposed in September 1956 that Norway should be «very libera!>, when it 
came to publishing information about the Terne system. MWDT argued 
that this would make it easier for the Norwegians to sell the weapon. A 
year later, the U.S. asked for a presentation of the Terne system in NATO's 
Defence Production Committee.6l At the same time the Americans were 
themselves considering buying the Norwegian weapon. «The U.S. Navy 
Bureau of Ordnance has unol11cially expressed considerable interest in the 
TERNE system, for possible application to small U.S. Navy A/S type 
ships,» Admiral M. R. Kelley wrote in May 1957.62 
It is also worth mentioning that the U.S., both through the MWDT and 
in particular through the MAAG (the military advisers at the NATO 
embassies), had an important influence on weapon procurement in the 
NATO countries. For example when the MWDT asked the Norwegian 
Minister of Defence to inform West Germany about Terne, Larkin in the 
MWDT wrote: «This ol11ce has received information through the U.S. 
Military Assistance Advisory Group to the Federal Republic of Germany 
that the German Navy is presently entering into the design stage of its 
construction program. Considerable thought is being directed toward the 
procurement and installation of the latest weapons and equipment 
possibJe.»o3 
The U.s. was the driving force in the selling of the system and the 
NDRE was, at this stage, much more reluctant to promote the system 
abroad. Norwegian researchers did not want to start selling the system 
until the work of development was totally finished. «A continous stream of 
representatives from allied nations now, will impede the progress of our 
work. Our attitude is that we must now finish the system and do the trials 
by ourselves. Once this has been done, we will invite all the nations 
interested and give them all the information they need for the assesment of 
the weapon,» the NDRE wrote in September 1956.64 
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Terne and K@ngsiberrg 
Vapenfabrilklk 
KY was not a (maturah) choice as production site for the Terne weapon. 
"The plant C .. ) was strongly affected by the circumstances of the com-
munity itself - a comparatively small community, somewhat isolated 
geographically from other areas, with a population consisting mostly of 
families who had lived in the community for generations.» 
The American analysts in the company Yulke were not impressed when, 
in 1953, they examined the possibilities for rationalizing the production at 
KY. They described a company with solid traditions of craftsmanship, but 
with practically no industrial capability.o5 The company, which was part 
of the Army until 1947, had mainly produced rifles (Krag-J0rgensen), 
tools and harpoons. 
Nevertheless, looking at the decision-making process at the NDRE, the 
impression one gets is that KV was the only real alternative. In the 
beginning of 1956, the steering committee for the Terne project agreed to 
establish contact on an informal basis, in order to explore the issue of 
production.66 The director of KV at that time, Bjarne Hurlen, remembers 
thaL the first contact was made in 1955 and that the iniLiaLive came from 
the NDRE67 The NDRE urged KV to make a decision on the production 
issue in March 1956 «as we regard it as important that the producer is 
included in the process as early as possible.»o8 The NDRE wanted KV to 
be the main contractor. There are no traces to be found of a debate inside 
the NDRE before KV was contacted. 
KV and N@rwegian mmltall1{ 
industll1{ before Terlne 
After the Second World War, spokesmen for the major political parties 
wanted to build up a Norwegian military industry. They did not, however, 
allocate any money to such a project. The need to rebuild society 
outweighed the need for new weapons in the early postwar years. The 
Ministry of Defence, several times in the early fifties, advised KV to base 
its activity on civilian products."9 Bjame Hurlen today says that most of the 
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products at that time were so old that the patent rights were outdated.7o 
The Storting finally fulfilled Some of its promises by granting NOK 25 
million to the modernization of KY in 1953. In the proposal from the 
Ministry of Industry the importance of Kongsberg Yiipenfabrikk as a 
(.;cornerstone for the military production» was stressed.7 ! The ministry 
wanted to upgrade the defence sector of the economy partly in order t~) 
ensure that maintenance requirements were met. Moreover, the supply of 
spare parts would afso be guaranteed by strengthening the indigenous 
military-industrial base. 
In 1955 the company started the production of a light anti-aircraft gun 
on license from the Swedish company Bofors. The L170 cannon required 
the construction of new production lines at KY and, as Olav Wicken 
writes, the project provided a basis for the future growth of Norwegian 
military industry." The L170 production also enabled KY to benefit tram 
the American "Off-Shore Procurement>, program. That is, the U.S. paid 
companies in Europe for the production of weapons intended for the 
military in European countries. In 1957 and 1958, the off-shore sale 
represented half of the total sales from KY.'J 
Political support for weapon production at KY pretty soon faded away. 
The weapon industry was less important than other civilian sectors of the 
economy during the postwar period. When politicians were forced to 
choose between industries, their priorities were dear. In the Annual 
Report from 1956 the Board of KY expressed the need to enlarge civilian 
production «because of a strong reduction in the purchases from the 
Ministry of Defence and uncertainty about the coming needs.» J4 The 
Ministry of Defence also formally informed KY that the company ,dn the 
coming years cannot count on any major contracts with the Norwegian 
arllled forces.» J5 As a consequence, the board of KY allocated NOK 12 to 
!3 million in order to upgrade civilian production in 1958.'" 
«Looking at the system as a whole, there were only tiny parts of the 
production that would nt into KY today. This is so not only for the 
cIcctronical equipment, but abo for the mechanical components,» Knut 
Seim and R. Lie Andersen (engineers in charge of the newly established 
R&D department at KY) wrote in February 1956.'7 Finding it hard to 
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estimate precisely how much of the work that could be done with the 
existing machinery at KY, they made a guess of less than 10 per cent. "The 
remaining 90 per cent consists of purchased ready-made electronical 
components that have to be built into bigger entities. This work and the 
production of special parts must be done by subcontractors.» 78 
Lie Andersen and Seim also wrote that the Terne project was totally 
different from the present production of KY. Nevertheless, they mentioned 
five reasons for a more thorough examination of the project. 
I) Terne will be an original product, enabling KY to act as more than just 
a subcontractor. 
2) Assuming that demand is forthcoming, the volume of production 
would be considerable. 
3) Because of the size of the project, it would be possible to pay for 
relatively large investments in equipment and manpower. 
4) It is a military project. 
5) There is an increasing tendency in the industry to apply servomecha-
nism and electronical equipment instead of purely mechanical equip-
ment. 
A further examination would also provide the company with «valuable 
information as to whether KV should direct its efforts towards products in 
which an appreciable part of the product is made up of servomechanical 
and electronical equipment,» Lie Andersen and Seim wrote. 
The examination was not pursued in detail. Six months after these 
deliberations at KY, the NDRE complained about lack of interest from the 
company. The researcher in charge of the NDRE department at Honen, 
Henrik Nodtvedt, wrote that the two visits to Honen and Kjeller «have not 
been followed up actively and it is now desirable that some of the person-
nel concentrate on Terne, if we want to avoid delays in production.>j79 
This letter from N0dtvedt provoked another report tram Seim at KY. 
And this time no consideration was taken of the benelits and drawbacks of 
the Terne project. It seemed as if it had already been decided that KV 
should be the main contractor for the Terne project.80 At this moment it 
was more important for KY to discuss the financial aspects of the contract. 
KY proposed to the NDRE «a kind of research and development con-
trac!».SI Fredrik M011er and the steering committee of the Terne project 
rejecteu sw.:h a contract because they wanted a maximum price and fixed 
terms of deliveries. The NDRE told KV officials that they would contact 
other companies if KV did not accept this type of contract.'2 
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KV accepted, it would appear, without much internal discussion, The 
KV leadership discussed the Terne contract on 4 December, 1957, They 
reckoned that the weapons system would cost approximately NOK 5 
million. dt is therefore a considerable financial risk for KV, and therefore 
the project must be managed within definite limits.»'3 This is how it was 
expressed in the report from the R&D department at KY. At this time, the 
company planned to let subcontractors do 40 per cent of the work. At KV 
the project necessitated the employment of ten people. 
It is difficult to assess the economics of the Terne project today. KV used 
much more money and manpower on the project than originally 
envisaged, and lack of experience obviously contributed to misleading 
estimates about the costs of the project. Even more important from an 
economic point of view was the question of income resulting from the sale 
of the system. When Bjarne Hurlen informed the Board of KV about the 
Terne project, he predicted «a considerable sale». He based his predictions 
on statements from the NDRE and «foreign naval authorities.»"' Kristian 
Sognen in the R&D department wrote at about the same time that the 
price of the weapon was of little importance as «one is today relatively 
alone on the market.»S5 
The market for Terne turned out to bc a Norwegian market. The Terne 
weapon was lighter than all other existing anti-submarine weapons in the 
fifties. The problem with the weapon, however, was that it did not work 
over long distances. The range of the missiles was too short. It should also 
be said that the market for anti-submarine weapons changed in the late 
fifties and the early sixties. Sweden and Holland cooperated in the 
development of a new anti-submarine weapons system and France 
developed its own system. In 1957 and 1958, when interest in Terne was 
at its peak, the French and Dutch-Swedish researchers had not reached the 
same stage as the Norwegians. In the Spring of 1957 the NDRE had 
received so many requests from abroad that they made a brochure for the 
Terne system. The NDRE sent the «Brief Description of Terne A/S 
Installation» to the MWDT, yet at the same time they complained about 
the interest from abroad:" We point out that the information submitted has 
been kept short and to the point in order to avoid instigating work on a 
report the usefulness of which will be questionable when the final report is 
finished. This again is of course dictated by a reluctance to start writing 
reports which will give the personnel engaged on Terne III an extra load of 
work, however little.»" 
Against this background it is reasonable to assume that the NDRE gave 
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KV the impression that it was easy to sell Terne abroad. The prospects for 
sales were good, but these prospects in themselves do not appear to have 
been important when KV decided to produce the Terne system. As already 
mentioned, the decision was taken before the end of October 1957. 
Hurlen's information to the Board on the Terne project six months later 
was technical and there were few considerations of costs and sales in it. 
The only discussion to be found in the files of KV today is the report 
Seim and Lie-Andersen wrote in February 1956. Hurlen today says that it 
was «in' fact M0ller, Hauge and I who took the decision.»" Jens Christian 
Hauge was the deputy chairman of the Board at KV - the chairman 
delegated most of his responsibility to Hauge. Hurlen says that M0ller and 
Hauge were the active ones - he was the passive party. The Terne project 
was not exactly what KV was looking for. «We needed the earnings fast 
and consequently we tricd to obtain license production,» says Hurlen. 
As soon as the production of Terne started at KV, Hurlen naturally 
began to argue in favour of the project. But it is likely that Hurlen is right 
in giving the impression of reluctance towards the project at Kongsberg. 
When KV got the L170 contract, the company had expressed a great deal 
of scepticism about the project.8S When Hurlen informed the members of 
the Board he also stressed several drawbacks of the Terne production. 
Why did the NDRE picik KV 
as main contractor? 
«You have a military research establishment and you have a military 
company - it's natural that they cooperate.» Willy Simonsen, the founder 
of the sonar producer company SIMRAO, gives voice to the most natural 
explanation. It might be true. KV's reputation was poor89 and the capa-
bilities of the company did not fit the requirements of the Terne project. 
Moreover, the administration at KV did not work actively to secure the 
Terne contract. But the alternatives to KV were not very much better. 
The Norwegian society of the fifties has been described as semi-
industrialized, the reason being that exports consisted mainly of raw 
materials and semi-finished products and only to a limited extent of manu-
factured goods. It was the energy and capital intensive electrochemical 
and electrometa!lurgical industries which were given priority after World 
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War 11. Machines in other partS of industry were not renewed. Professor 
DP. Campbell of Massachusets Institute of Technology (MIT) wrote, with 
the Norwegians Hakon Buset and Haakon Sandvold, a report on the state 
of the metallurgical industry and the engineering industries. The con-
clusion was not encouraging: Norwegian industry does not operate with 
«the accuracy required for the production of gears and components used 
by the military, or more modern highly developed Lypes of mechanical, 
hydraulic and electrical equipment for control.»90 
Because of U.S. financial support and for security reasons, the option of 
allowing foreign companies to produce the Terne system was never 
discussed. 
The assumption is that the NDRE, because of low industrial standards 
in Norway, understood that they had to follow the production closely 
wherever it was. The NDRE expected the contractor to send his em-
ployees to the NDRE laboratories for a period of time. The Establishment 
also planned to send their own employees to the company chosen, in order 
to follow the production of Terne, The question therefore is not whether 
the company chosen had the capacity to produce Terne. The question is 
rather which company was the natural choice for the NDRE. 
Traditionally there were other companies with closer contact to the 
NDRE than KY. The NDRE department for sonars and submarine-
t-ighting in HOrlt:n was in charge of major parts of the Terne project and 
this department had contact with several companies in the town of Horten 
itself. The Navy yard was here and the only commercial sonar company, 
SIMRAD, was based in Horten. The tirst leader of the Terne project, 
Thorvald Gerhardsen, worked in SIMRAD, and the lirst sonars for fishing 
vessels made by the company were originally developed at the NDRE. 
The NDRE also tried to include SIMRAD in the Terne project. It was 
obviously important to let SIMRAD produce the sonars in the weapons 
system. This is illustrated by the fact that the NDRE wanted both 
SIMRAD and KY as main contractors. Ideally, KY should be the main 
contractor, but SIMRAD would not have the status of subcontractor for 
KY. The NDRE wanted to sign a special contract with SIMRAD. The 
director of KY, Bjarne Hurlen, protested several times against this arrange-
ment, without much effect. Informing the Board at KY, Hurlen said that 
"SIMRAD perhaps doesn't fully believe that KY has the capabilites 
required for the production of the system.»91 
SIMRAD was regarded as a more qualitied company than KY, but 
perhaps in a narrower field. The researcher in charge of the electronics 
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(then named Telecommunication) department at the NDRE, Karl Holberg, 
also regarded SIMRAD as better qualified to sell the Terne system than 
KV,'J2 It should also be said that the founder of SIMRAD, Willy Simonsen, 
was a good friend of Fredrik Moller, Simonsen had done research for the 
allies in England, together with the men who founded the NDRE 
The negotiations between SIMRAD and the NDRE broke down for 
different reasons and the result was that KV became the sole main Con-
tractor, A consequence of the failure of negotiations was that SIMRAD 
withdrew totally from the project. My point here is that SIMRAD in 
cooperation with the Navy yard and SOme other mechanical shops in 
Horten, must have been a more natural choice than Kongsberg Vapen-
fabrikk. 
In Oslo and Strommen, close to Kjeller, there were also some com-
panies with closer historical ties to the NDRE than KV. Strommen 
Verksted was one of the first companies in Norway to show an interest in 
servomechanical production. Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrikk (STK) 
(then an affiliate of ITT) was also mentioned as «progressive» in a letter 
about servomechanical industry written by the NDRE researcher Erik 
Klippenberg in 1953,''' In 1957 STK tried to start servotechnical 
production in cooperation with the Christian Michelsen Institute in 
Bergcn. 
NEBB (Norsk Elektrisk & Brown Boverii, Oslo) was once asked by the 
NDRE to produce servo equipment components, but the company 
declined.'!" I do not know why NEBB refused, but it shows that there must 
have been some potential for Terne production at NEBB also. In Oslo 
there were several mechanical companies with facilities comparable to 
those of KY. 
KV was not the only military company in Norway. Rautl)ss Ammuni-
sjonsfabrikk (RA) was bigger and more important in the fifties than KV.''' 
RA had modernized more than KV in the fifties, but their knowledge was 
confined to a narrow field - ammunition and rockets. The management at 
RA was not particularly good. «It's a pity, the conditions at RA, but with 
lack of initiative, enterprise and energy, one will not have results at RA, 
and RA cannot expect others to do the work for them,» one of the 
managers of KY wrote in 1960.96 
Asking Finn Lied today why the NDRE picked KV as main contractor, 
he says that Bjarnc Hurlcn was an «outstanding leader with a solid 
military education.» This does not fit very well with the lack of interest 
which KV showed in the early phase. Our search for explanations may be 
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rewarded if we look at some of the personalities involved. Bjame Hurlen 
says that it was Moller and Hauge who urged KY to accept the Teme 
contract. It is also likely that Moller and Hauge had a decisive word when 
the NDRE picked KY as main contractor. M011er was director at the 
NDRE and was formally responsible for the decision. Hauge was the 
deputy chairman of the Board for the military companies (KV, RA and the 
Navy yard at Horten). A closer look at Hauge's background is required in 
order to appreciate his position of influence. 
lens Christian Hauge was the leader of Milorg (the resistance move-
ment) during the latter part of the Second World War. He was private 
secretary to the Prime Minister until he was appointed Minister of 
Defence. He resigned from the Cabinet in the early part of 1952 and 
started working for the Labour Party - playing an important role in the 
making of the 1953 party program. He was looked upon as one of thc 
closest advisers of Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen in the postwar period. 
"The never-sleeping conscience and critics on a broad range of political 
issues,» the party secretary Haakon Lie wrote.97 Gerhardsen himself wrote 
that Hauge had «a decisive influence» in the discussions about a Nordic 
alliance as opposed to NATO." The Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlan-
der wrote in his memoirs about the negotiations on Nordic cooperation 
that «it was a big surprise in Karlstad that the Norwegian delegation was 
su tu tally dominated by Hauge.»99 Hauge was also considered a stubborn 
and not very cooperative man. He was in serious conflict with several 
Chiefs of Defence. Inside the Cabinet he was in conflict with the Minister 
of Finance, Olav Meisdalshagen. Another leading politician at that time, 
Olav Oksvik, said that the conflicts between Meisdalshagen and Hauge 
was one of the reasons why Gerhardsen resigned in 1951. '00 The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Halvard Lange was also opposed to including Hauge in 
the Cabinet in 1955 because of Hauge's tendency to concern himself with 
issues outside his own department. 101 
lens Christian Hauge worked as a legal adviser at the NATO head-
quarters in Paris in 1957-58. 102 The Norwegian Government asked for his 
advice several times, and asked him to participate in several internationa1 
negotiations as the Norwegian representative. 
At KV, Hauge was closely involved in the discussions that led to the 
production of Li70. IOJ He was used as legal adviser and as a mediator 
between American and Norwegian authorities. He had also granted 
money to the NO RE in the early years. «Destiny has been good, or 
Gerhardsen has been helpful by making Hauge Minister of Defence,» 
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Randers wrote. 104 It is a fact that the NDRE got more money than most of 
the other research institutions in Norway at that time. 
«M0ller and Hauge talked with each other every day,» Hurlen says 
today. Documents from that time indirectly support the argument that 
M01ler and Hauge decided by themselves that KV should be the main 
contractor for the Terne systems. As stated above there are no minutes 
from discussions in the files of the KV or the NDRE relating to the choice 
of KV as the main contractor. Of course, there was no need to put it in 
writing since the matter was decided orally by two good friends. 
Why did MfJlm~er and Hauge 
pick KV? 
Hauge was obviously concerned about KV's future. As from 1948 he had 
been working for the modernization of KY. After assessing the documents, 
it seems that Hauge was never forced to defend his position. The assump-
tion is simply that he wanted a strong military company both for strategic 
military reasons and for economic reasons. He wanted a company in 
Norway that could produce and maintain the modern equipment of the 
Military. It is likely that Hurlen used some of the same arguments as 
Hauge when he informed the members of the board about the Terne 
project. His presentation of the project focused on its importance for the 
development of the military production lines. He said little about the wider 
perspectives: the Terne production would qualify the company for servo 
technical production which in turn would qualify the company for the 
advanced processing of all kinds of civilian products. 
Shortly after the Terne decision was made, Frcdrik M01ler showed, in 
practice, that he wanted to encourage civilian spinoffs from the research 
done at the NDRE. He became the first director of Noratom, a company 
set up for the commercial utilization of patents and for the ideas originated 
in research institutes.lOS This company was created mainly for the 
application of work from the civilian institutes, but it shows that M011er 
was concerned about the R&D-based industry. The reason why M011er 
preferred KV from the very beginning can be traced to the fact that he 
distinguished sharply between military and non-military products. In the 
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concluding chapter, I will argue that M011er in a way was caught by the 
system. The NDRE grew more and more military-like and it became more 
and more difficult to think about non-military producers of a military 
product. 
The contract between the NDRE and KY was signed in January 1959.KY 
offered a fixed price (NOK 16.020.000) for the three systems and the 
delivery date was fixed for two years later.]()c, It started off fairly well. 
«Kongsberg Yilpenfabrikk has made impressive efforts and the coopera-
tion between all parties involved has been outstanding,» Finn Lied 
informed the Ministry of Defence in September 1959.](n KY also asked 
for advanced payment as the «progression of the Terne systems is faster 
than settled in the contracl.»I08 Even so, the people in charge of the 
production, the R&D department of KY, complained that the work was 
not proceeding as fast as it ought to. According to the internal plan, the 
production was delayed from 14 days to one month during most of 1959. 
At the end of that year, the US Procurement Office ordered two Terne 
systems; and these new orders contributed to longer delays in 1960 and 
196 L The delivery of systems number four and five were seriously 
delayed. The electronical control equipment, the launcher and parts of the 
loading-mechanisms caused the longest delays,l()l) 
The delays provoked harsh reactions: "State-owned companies clearly 
don't take dates of delivery very seriously,» remarked Thorleif Pettersen, 
the leader of the Technical Department at the Navy Headquarters. I 10 The 
council of the NDRE which consisted of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, civilian 
researchers and the department heads at the NDRE, discussed the delays 
at the end of October. They decided that the NDRE should intensify its 
efforts to help KV as the company had problems, "particularly concerning 
the quality of the work». " I 
Finn Lied pointed oUlthat the sonarS and the fuses of the Terne system 
were the main bottlenecks of production.''' The R&D department also 
cited the fuses as a main problem. Generally speaking KY felt that much 
of the problem was due to the poor quality of the blueprints and 
construction drawings from the NDRE.1I3 However, the NDRE and to a 
certain extent the Navy felt that the lack of competence at KY was the 
main cause for the delays. 
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The Terne weapons on board Norwegian vessels today are distinctly 
different from the prototype. The first trials in Key West in the fall of 1958 
uncovered 62 substantial changes that had to be made. During the winter 
of 1960 the steering committee of the Terne project discussed three of the 
most profound proposals for change: I) a longer-range missile, 2) tran-
sistorizing of the computers and 3) new scanning sonar. 1I4 Most of the 
proposals were acted upon, and the changes were so basic that it became 
impossible to use the prototype for practice at the Navy school as 
origin all y planned.' IS 
The changes were discussed in the Navy, at the NDRE and at Kongs-
berg. This fact illuminates the close ties between these institutions. The 
NDRE and KV grew closer. Many of the people working with the Terne 
project at the NDRE continued with the project at KV, Some of the 
engineers at KV worked for nearly One year at the NDRE to gain 
knowledge of the project. In a way, the NO RE served as the research and 
development department for KV and KV functioned as the workshop for 
the NDRE. To complicate relations even more, the NDRE was also the 
formal buyer of the three first Terne systems. It was the MWDP which 
granted money to the NDRE enabling them to order the weapons. In the 
Navy both the NDRE and KV were regarded as the producers of the 
systems. These vague relations contributed to a promotion of the Terne 
weapons abroad that must have been confusing. 
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The sale of Terne 
KY has produced 14 Terne systems in all. The U.s. bought two systems 
and then returned them to Norway. West Germany also bought two 
systems. The remaining ten systems were bought by the Norwegian Navy. 
This figure includes the first three that were paid for by the MWDP. The 
sales effort abroad can be divided into two stages. In the beginning the 
NO RE promoted Terne within NATO. During this period the Navy 
omcers and the procurement offices in different NATO countries were 
involved. In 1960 when the Norwegian government decided to modernize 
the Navy and buy vessels and equipment at the sum of NOK 840 million, 
the sales approach to Terne changed. The modernization plan required 
large purchases from abroad. However, contracts with foreign companies 
made it possible to force foreign countries to buy Norwegian products, in a 
kind of barter trade. One example is the agreement with West Germany 
regarding the purchase of 15 submarines at the price ofNOK 260 million. 
West Germany pledged to buy Norwegian equipment for approximately 
NOK 430 million. 116 It is evident that the sale of Terne to West Germany 
was a political as well as a Naval/Military issue. 
In discussing the likely income for KY, I showed that there was already 
a keen interest in the Terne weapon in 1957. The NO RE was reluctant to 
spend time and money on sales at such an early stage. At the end of 1957, 
the NDRE was persuaded by the MWDP and the Norwegian Military 
Attache in Bonn to demonstrate the system for West German Naval 
officersll7 Less than a month after the system was presented, the steering 
committee of the Terne project decided to start working on selling the 
system. «The Brief Description of Terne» that had been sent to the West 
Germans was replaced by a sales brouchure. Bjarne Hurlen stressed the 
advantages of personal acquaintances; we will circulate information about 
the system «through the representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the 
Military Attaches, as was done in Bonn,» Hurlen said. lls 
In the spring of 1958 the NDRE presented the Terne weapon to repre-
sentatives from all the interested NATO countries. The NDRE wrote 
afterwards that the demonstration was «successful, although there were 
some minor accidenls.,,119 The accidents consisted of the sonars being 
non-operational; however, the other parts of the system worked. At the 
end of that year SACLANT wanted to present technical facts about the 
weapon in a seminar about anti-submarine fighting.120 However, after the 
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trials at Key West in the fall of 1958, the report was delayed and Terne 
was not presented at the seminar. 
At another NATO meeting in Paris in May 1959 Terne was presented. 
The most optimistic Norwegians expected that NATO would agree to a 
coordinated production program of the Terne systems for all NATO 
countries. The Ministry of Defence sent this telegram to the representative 
in Paris, Nils S",b0: 
1. df there should be a need for Terne inside NATO which exceeds the 
production capacity in Norway, the Norwegian Government will want 
to discuss the possibilities of a coordinated NATO production program 
for the equipment. 
2. The development costs for the system will not be included in the price 
of systems sent to other countries.»I:?! 
The optimism was based on the keen interest expressed by many coun-
tries. For example, the lirst promotion of Terne in the V.S. went smoothly 
without problems. The Norwegian delegation sent there in August 1959 
found that although the Americans did not have much knowledge of 
Terne, they showed great interest and belief in the Norwegian weapons 
system. In September 1959 Vice Admiral John Hayward said that Terne 
was the best existing anti-submarine weapon when he confirmed that the 
V.S. Navy wanted to buy it. l21 It was Admiral Colwell in the MWDT who 
informed the NDRE about the American decision to buy three Terne 
systems. 
It is hard to trace any active eCfort on the part of the Norwegians to sell 
the system to the V.S. Navy. On the contrary, Henrik N!<ldtvedt at the 
NDRE complained that the Norwegian Navy had acted against the 
interests of the people selling Terne. «My impression is that the Navy, 
during their stay in the U.S, has been so keen on saving money on their 
existing vessels» that the Americans thought they were being helpful when 
they offered to take over the Terne contracts originally made by the 
NDRE.l2l In other words, the Navy wanted to let the U.S. Navy take care 
of the trials of the Terne weapons which were paid for by the NDRE. The 
different points of view of the Norwegian Navy and the NDRE did not 
make a big difference as far as the sale to the U.S. was concerned. Selling 
to West Germany, however, was an uphill battle, and the disagreements 
between the researchers and the officers became more profound. 
The promotion of Terne in West Germany was seen as essential. "If 
Germany decides to buy the Swedish-Dutch system, it might be of vital 
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importance for the attitudes of other NATO countries ( ... J. On the other 
hand, if we manage to introduce Terne in West Germany, we may also 
reckon on considerable orders from other NATO countries. Contracts to a 
value of between NOK 50 and NOK 100 million are not unrealistic.» [2< 
The Chief of KY's Oslo office, Y ngvar Daasnes, did not exaggerate the 
importance of West German deliveries when he made the above statement 
in a letter to the Ministry of Defence. To judge the sales effort it is 
therefore necessary to study the promotion of Terne in West Germany. 
The lirst contact beween the West German Navy and the NDRE was 
made at the end of 1957. During most of 1958 and 1959 a representative 
of KY in Bonn managed most of the selling of the Terne. It was a big 
surprise in April 1959 when the commercial attache in Bonn, was notilied 
that the West German Navy had decided to buy the Swedish-Dutch system 
equipped with French sonar parts. The commercial attache asked the 
West Germans [0 postpone the decision. The Ministry of Defence in Oslo 
decided to ask the Chief of the Navy to urge his West German counterpart 
to change his mind,l25 
The Norwegian efforts did not help. West German officers mentioned 
two main reasons for not buying Terne: the range was too short,[26 and the 
possibilities for logistics and training were better in the system which was 
made in Holland and France.'" Although the main purchase of anti-
submarine weapons for the West German Navy was already decided, there 
were still possibilities for less sizeable purchases - one of which was the 
installation of Terne in patrol vessels. 
The installation of Terne in patrol craft vessels and in lishing vessels for 
use when mobilized was the aim when the promotion was politicized in 
1960. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence told its West German counter-
part that Terne was one of the items West Germany ought to buy in 
response to the Norwegian purchase of submarines from West Germany. 
The West German representative in the negotiations said that «there were 
some doubts about the Terne system, but that a West German technical 
commission was prepared to come to Norway in the near future for a 
thorough examination of the project with Norwegian experts.» [28 This 
meeting was convened on 21 April and ended on 23 April 1960. 
The meeting encouraged both the NO RE and KY. «I believe that we 
have convinced the German delegation that Terne is not a toy put together 
by a little country, but an anti-submarine weapon that ought to be the 
subject of serious deliberations,» Lied wrote after the meeting. 129 An even 
more optimistic comment is found in a report written by KY's Knut Seim 
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ut the end of May. He reported that Captain Meuseman in the West 
German Ministry of Defence had proposed that «the Navy should 
examine the possibilities of installing Terne weapons on ten patrol craft 
vessels which had not yet been constructed. Meuseman also aired the 
possibility of putting the Terne systems onboard auxiliary vessels».'''' 
The West German Government ordered two Terne systems at the end of 
1961, one of the systems was not equipped with sonar as the Germans 
wanted to use a Dutch sonaL')] The Navy wanted to test these systems for 
a period of two years and KY expected to sell more to West Germany after 
these tests were completed. Commander lens Sele described West 
German officers as regretting that they had not bought Terne when they 
had the opportunity in 1958.'30 In spite of all the good will, the West 
Germans never bought any more Terne systems. 
Summarizing the attempts to sell to West Germany in 1965, Finn Lied 
wrote that the sale of the two Terne systems was a consequence of 
pressure from the West German Ministry of Defence, "as the German 
Navy has been hesitating.»'33 Lied wrote that this hesitation was a result 
of lack of experience inside the West German Navy. «They were com-
pelled to seek support wherever they could find it. The Dutch Navy at an 
early stage offered assistance in the training of West German anti-
submarine personnel. (. .. ) When the West German Navy was to buy the 
first anti-submarine weapons it was natural that the Dutch were consulted 
and that their advice weighed heavily.»'" Lied at the same time proposed 
that Norway should help in training West German Navy officers. This 
proposal was never acted upon. 
The fruitless sale effort also explained as a matter of politics. ,,Jt's 
evident that it's wholly a matter of political means. Our items, too, must be 
promoted with a blend of political pressure. If not, the political pressure of 
others will decide,» Finn Lied wrote in a general report on the sale of 
Norwegian military equipment.'35 There is no doubt that the politicians 
and the omcers in Norway were hesitant when the NDRE and KY asked 
for help in selling Terne. As late as in 1966 the deputy Chief of the Navy 
reacted negatively when the Navy was asked to promote the weapons 
system in Denmark. «The Chief of the Navy should not be a «glorified 
salesman!»» was his remark. 13b 
Next, I will examine the sales promotion in order to illuminate how the 
different institutions managed to blend the commercial, professional and 
political aspects of the work. 
The Ministry of Defence reluctantly became an important performer in 
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the sales promotion. In April 1958 the NDRE wanted the Minister of 
Defence to promote Terne at a NATO meeting. That was the first time the 
Minister was asked to promote Norwegian commercial interests. It is 
unclear what he acually did at this meeting of NATO Ministers of 
Defence. In general, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence was unwilling to 
become involved in these matters. R. J. Mowill, who worked with KV, 
complained in December 1958 that the Ministry had not informed KV 
about the possiblities for coproduction of the Sidewinder rocket. Because 
of the Ministry of Defence, Mowill wrote: «Norway is falling behind C .. ) 
totally by failing to keep informed about the weapon cooperation inside 
NATO.» 137 
Six months later, when West Germany decided not to buy Terne, the 
Ministry of Defence discussed thoroughly the possibilites for promoting 
the weapons system. The Head of the procurement office, Johan K. 
Christie, gave this brief of the deliberations: «It's, of course, difficult for 
Norwegian officials to act more or less as salesmen for Norwegian 
companies, even if these are state-owned. On the other hand, there are no 
doubts that we are now strongly in favour of all efforts that can lead to 
increased employment, and it's partly for this reason that the politicians 
are now willing to go considerably further than they would otherwise have 
done when it comes to official Norwegian initiatives.»'" 
It took some time for attitudes to change. [n August 1959 the Minister 
of Defence refused to send a promotion letter to the Government in 
Spain. I ]9 However, when the agreement on the purchase of submarines 
from West Germany was made, the Ministry of Defence became active 
sellers of Terne. Finn Lied wrote that the Minister of Defence had 
mentioned the sale of Terne as «extremely important» when he informed 
the Military Committee of the Starting. The main purpose of his visit to 
West Germany was to contribute to such a sale, Lied wrote. l4O It would 
appear that the Minister of Defence in many ways adopted the arguments 
of the NDRE. The Terne project was presented as one of the two sole 
independent Norwegian projects, the other was the Norwegian built vessel 
Nasty. «The sale of Terne to West Germany will give Norwegian compa-
nies a technical position and it will greatly contribute to the laying of a 
platform for technologically advanced products in the Norwegian 
industry,» Finn Lied wrotc. 141 
The director of the NDRE looks today on the Terne project as the one 
which contributed to changes in the attitudes of the Ministry of Defence 
and the Navy. «The lower ranking officials in the Navy and the Ministry 
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fell in the beginning a moral obligation not to sell Norwegian products, 
while at the same time colleagues in other countries had a different 
attitude and worked hard in promoting the products of their countries. 
After Terne the Norwegian attitude changed dramatically,» Lied says.l42 
The NDRE and KV blamed the Navy for the first failure of the sales 
promotion in West Germany. Informing the Ministry of Defence about the 
West German decision not to buy Terne, Yngvar Daasnes mentioned two 
facls that had been vital for the Germans: 1 )They had not received an 
official report after the trials of Terne in Key West, and 2) they had the 
impression that the Norwegian Navy was not wholeheartedly supporting 
the system. «Regierungsbaudirektor Schiiler drew our attention to the fact 
that neither the Norwegian Navy nor the Norwegian authorities had 
backed KV in the Terne case, except for the fact that the Military Attache 
in Bonn on a couple of occasions had accompanied the representatives of 
KV when visiting the Verteidigungsministerium. ( ... ) the Dutch Navy had 
taken an entirely different attitude ( ... ) High-ranking Dutch officers had 
contacted their German colleagues in such matters,» Daasnes wrote. I;)" 
This reiteration of the West German points of view was repeated in 
another letter from the commercial attache in Bonn, Gunnar Rogstad. 144 
He and Daasnes both asked the Ministry of Defence to contact the Navy 
and persuade them to contact the Germans. Whether it was this request 
which prompted the Navy to act, I do not know. The Chief of the Navy 
met his West German counterpart in April that year and in the beginning 
of June he sent a letter offering a full and proper briefing about Terne by 
technical experts in the Navy. The Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Johs 
E. Jacobsen, referred to the fact that the U.S. Navy wanted to buy several 
systems and he wrote that the weapon worked efficiently. No further 
compliments were paid to the Norwegian-developed weapon in the 
letteL I45 
The Navy was vital for sales promotion because it was responsible for 
the operative tests of Terne. Navy officers were consequently included in 
all delegations presenting the system. The NO RE found that Navy parti-
cipation sometimes damaged the sale effort. At a meeting with the West 
Germans in Horten, the Navy representatives started discussing alternative 
positions for the sonars on the vessels. The information used did not 
correspond with information given by the NDRE and both Erik Klippen-
berg and Karl Holberg at NDRE reacted spontaneously: «The Navy and 
the NDRE should at least present a similar view to the outside world. 
What's been done in this case must have confused the Germans,» 
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Klippenberg wrote. «It's talk like that which damages our commercial 
opportunities,» Holberg wrote. 146 
As late as the summer of 1962, it would seem that the leadership of the 
Navy was indifferent to the sales promotion. 8jame Hurlen asked the 
Chief of the Navy, Admiral Erling G. Hostvedt, to promote Terne during 
his forthcoming visit to West Germany. «it would be of decisive signi-
ticance if you ( ... ) c1arilied the Norwegian Navy's attitude towards Terne 
as an anti-submarine weapon and gave your assessment of the results 
from the Key West trials. ( ... ) The German Ministry of Defence has made it 
clear that if only the German Navy could be convinced that Terne is as 
good or better than the weapon from 80fors (Swedish/Dutch ed.), a 
purchase from Norway could be realised immediately. As far as I can see, 
nobody can do this more authoritatively than the Norwegian Navy.» '" 
The NO RE also complained about KV's sales efforts. After a meeting in 
Kiel in the summer of 1958, Karl Holberg summarized his grievances 
about KV in this way: «8ecause of their lack of competence in all fields, 
the negotiators from KV have not been able to discover the most 
elementary forms of deception, nor have they been able to distinguish 
between what ought and what ought not to be said.»'" KV had no 
experience from high level negotiations, was seriously lacking in 
knowledge about operational and technical issues and knew nothing about 
the industry as a whole: a fact that led to wrong judgements about the 
competition from other companies, Holberg wrote. He was afraid of 
serious setbacks because of the lack of competence: 
«a} The possibilities of selling the system in Germany must be given up 
without serious negotiations. 
b) A number of our good arguments are damaged. 
cl 8y giving superfluous information we have strengthened a German 
industry which will exploit its position on the international Terne 
market and damage the Norwegian specialized industry. 
d) 8y sending inaccurate information about Terne one has (. .. ) weakened 
the authority of KV and the NDRE in this field.» 
There are signs that KV strengthened sales promotion during 1958. 
Representatives of KV were in Paris and 80nn several times to push for 
the sale of Terne. 
The NORE waS involved in the Terne project to the bitter end. 
Formally, the Establishment should not have become involved in the sales 
promotion, but some of the researchers obviously felt they had 
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responsibility for the sale. Most of the complaints voiced against other 
institutions and persons came from the NDRE. 
There were at least three formal reasons and one psychological reason 
why the NDRE became involved in the promotion of Terne. The steady 
changes made to the weapons system, the fact that the NDRE had the 
license rights to the system and the NDRE's position as technical adviser 
for the Chief of the Navy were the formal reasons. Even more important 
was the view taken by Finn Lied in 1960 when he presented the sale of 
Terne as one of the major tasks of the Establishment. "We cannot exist 
unless somebody oscs our excellent results. However, we are forcing our 
products on the industry and on the customers. This works, but not on its 
own.» 149 
The NDRE doubted the abilities of all the other Terne sellers, yet, on 
some occasions, it was actually the NDRE which acted as an obstacle to 
the overall sales effort. The NDRE wanted to keep the system as secret as 
possible. In 1960 a U.S. government official complained that he had seen 
some classified information about Terne in a public magazine. This 
episode led to stricter routines at the NDRE and even the sales brochure 
waS classified as (restricted»,ISO 
When KY wanted to sell Terne to Finland in 1965, both the Navy 
headquarters and the NDRE were against it for security reasons. They 
were afraid that the Soviet Union could get information about the system 
through Finland. The Ministry of Defence overruled both the Navy and 
the NDRE, but sales promotion was delayed because of these discussions. 
The final decision led to a furious remark in the Navy Headquarters: 
«Putting it mildly, it does seem somewhat odd that the «producer» of a 
sensitive weapons system is allowed to impose his will on commercial 
grounds,)) wrote one of the officers,I51 
Why did 'ferne not sell? 
Practically all Norwegians who knew the Terne system were convinced 
that the system was of high quality. The first trials in Key West in 1958 
confirmed that the weapons system was at least potentially very good. 
Captain Charles Stephan in the U.S. Navy gave this judgement: 
«Although important questions concerning the system remain unan-
swered, two essential attributes of the Terne III system have been demon-
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strated. The foremost of these is simplicity, which sets this system well 
apart from other submarine systems. Simplicity and the complementary 
characteristics of light weight, small size and reasonable cost, all of which 
the Terne III system has, are much sought afler and, at the same time, rare 
in present day antisubmarine systems. The second attribute is the 
effectiveness the Terne III system demonstrated in these tests against 
submarines of the Guppy and fast attack class. Although this statement of 
its ability must be qualified in various ways, the fact remains that, under 
the conditions of these tests, the Terne III system obtained an acceptable 
hit performance against evasive submarines of these types. These two 
virtues of the system alone advocate its further development. The fact that 
the Terne III system demonstrated its capabilities despite definitive 
handicaps indicates that its potentialities may be greater than the 
capabilities it demonstrated during project OP/S463.»152 
The potential was good, but trials on an American vessel in 1962 
showed that there were still some serious weaknesses in the system. The 
U.S.N. officers complained about the sonars and the fuses. The NDRE did 
not fully accept the criticism. It was argued, for example, that the U.S. 
navy men did not handle the sonars in the right way.'53 The Norwegian 
Navy supported the NDRE's judgement of the weapons system. The Chief 
of the service in charge of submarine warfare, Jens Sele, summarized the 
results of other tests in 1962 in a much more positive tone than had the 
Americans. «The Terne weapons system (is) as a whole very good, with 
qualities that are not to be found on other comparable weapons 
systems.»'" Sele mentioned that there were still problems with the fuses 
and the searching sonar. It was implied in his statement that some work 
still remained to be done in order to perfect the system. 
To a certain extent it is probably right to say that the NDRE and the 
Navy oflicers promoting Terne continued to do what had been done ten 
years earlier with Terne 11. They tried to sell a weapons system that did not 
work as efficiently as it ought to. This is, however, not unusal for sellers of 
newly developed, complicated products. There were probably other 
factors that contributed just as much to the failure in the international 
marketing of the product. 
KV and the NDRE started the sales campaign too late. At the outset, 
Terne was supposed to be ready for production in the beginning of 1957. 
Delayed deliveries of important parts and technical problems led to a 
prolongation of the development period of more than a year. In addition, 
the attitude in the NDRE was to do one thing at a time. First they 
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developed the system, then they started selling it. The West German Navy, 
for instance, was very interested in Terne in 1957 as there were no 
alternative weapons systems at the time. Two years later the Bofors 
company in Sweden and a Dutch company had developed an alternative 
and the West Germans had a choice. The official explanation that the 
missile range of the Norwegian system was too short obviously also played 
some part. 
Finn Lied felt that the competitors used political means more actively 
than the NDRE. That seems a good judgement, but it was obviously not 
the only reason. We have seen how Norwegian politicians won the support 
of the West German politicians. The problem was that the West German 
Navy rejected the Norwegian system on the basis of professional argu-
ments. After all, the West German purchase of two Terne systems was the 
result of hard work by Norwegian politicians. 
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Some academics maintain that the arms race ongInates with and is 
sustained by the technologists of the weapon industry. The theory is that 
there is not necessarily much demand for the new weapons, but that there 
is a very strong supply side pushing for production. It is going too far to put 
this story of the Terne development into such a large theoretical frame, but 
it is striking how this weapons system was developed without «anybody" 
ever asking for it. Of course, there was a need for more efficient anti-
submarine weapons, but such needs were traditionally met by big foreign 
defence contractors. Furthermore, when the Norwegian weapons system 
was developed, only one navy wanted it; the other navies rejected it as 
energetically as possible. 
Nevertheless, the weapons system was developed and it was regarded as 
a success, a success because the weapons system worked but also because 
the NDRE and KV acquired influential «friends». A system of supporters 
was built up around the Terne project, and at the end of the project 
periode, KV and the NDRE had contacts in the U.S., in the Starting and in 
the Ministry of Defence. These contacts were vital for the continuation of 
weapon development at KV and the NDRE. 
The historian of technology, Thomas P. l-Iughes, maintains that tech-
nical change is promoted inside a system of different people, institutions, 
techniques and administrative considerations. All the parts of this system 
influence other parts of the system. In a dynamic process people inside the 
system are shaped by each other and by the technology which in turn is 
shaped by economics, which again shapes the people. 155 
This perspective on technical change serves as a point of reference 
when looking at the development of Terne. In the very beginning, there 
were only some researchers in the NDRE who wanted to develop the 
weapons system. There were researchers inside the Establishment who 
wanted to give Terne III lower priority. The Navy and the Coast Guard 
were at times directly opposed to the new weapon project. With good help 
from the dollar-providing MWDT, the researchers steadily convinced new 
institutions and persons about the need for Terne. But the researchers 
themselves were also influenced by the system they had created. 
The NDRE grew into a purely military research institute mainly 
because of increased international tension, but the Terne projects, both 
Terne II and Terne Ill, also led to a militarization of the research. The 
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NDRE was from the beginning strongly supported by the Ministry of 
Defence, but the armed services were sceptical. Officers tended to doubt 
the military and operational qualifications of NDRE researchers. To 
overcome this scepticism, it was probably important for the NDRE to 
behave and look like a military organization. Although some of the 
documents from the time give the impression that the NDRE oversaw 
Navy scepticism, it is worth mentioning that the Assistant Director at the 
NDRE, Reidar Danielsen, emphasized the need for goodwill in the Navy 
when he argued for the completion of the Terne II project. After all, the 
Norwegian Navy had the power of veto - if they had refused to participate 
in the Terne development, the project would have been stopped. 
The Navy had such a «negative power» because of the financial aid 
from the U.S., which was given on the condition that the Navy supported 
the project. The establishment of the Mutual Weapons Development 
Program (MWDP) came as a surprise to the NDRE. The researchers did 
not expect that kind of support. However, when the possibilities for huge 
dollar grants emerged, the NDRE obviously emphasized the military 
aspects of it's research more forcefully. The MWDT in Paris was included 
in the Terne system. For some years the Terne developers hoped all the 
NATO countries would buy the Norwegian system. These expectations 
were mainly due to the MWDT. The NDRE also learned how to apply for 
money through the Teme project - when the Establishment looked for 
new projects it must have been tempting to embark on projects that could 
be financed by the U.S. 
The inclusion of the Navy and the MWDT.in the Terne project explains 
to a certain extent why KY was picked as the main contractor of the 
weapon. The company had only IO per cent of the knowledge required for 
the production of Terne. The managers of the company were not 
particularly eager to start on the relatively complicated Terne project. It is 
likely that lens Christian Hauge and Fredrik Moller by themselves chose 
KY to be the main contractor. At this time, Hauge had for several years 
been working for the modernization ofKY. His motives are simple to trace 
in that he wanted the Terne project to boost the ongoing process of 
modernization. Moller was a good friend of Hauge but it is likely that the 
influence from the Navy and the U.S. also made it natural for him to pick a 
military company as main contractor. 
When K Y waS chosen, the system also had a new member. The director 
at KY, Bjame Hurlen, emerged as one of the most active Terne advocates. 
The interests of KY also became a predominant consideration for the 
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politicians who supported Terne. The Ministry of Defence got openly 
involved in the sale of Terne in order to secure jobs at KY. 
In other words, KY changed some of the goals of the Terne system, but 
KY itself was also influenced by the system. The company wanted to take 
advantage of other U.s.-sponsored military projects. The NDRE emerged 
as a research & development department for KV during the Terne process. 
The result was that KY had both a powerful R&D department and 
contacts with «rich)} Americans - it would have been strange if the 
company had not tried to take advantage of these new possibilities. 
In sum, the NDRE, the MWDT, KY and some others developed into a 
small military-industrial complex. This complex was fully mobilized in the 
early 1960s when West Germany was forced to buy two Terne weapons. 
In spite of heavy political pressure the Germans did not buy more than two 
weapons systems, primarily because the West German Navy was opposed 
to the sale. 
The complex which developed as a result of the Terne project might 
have been a decisive factor in other military and political decisions later in 
the sixties. It seems pretty clear that the Penguin project was initiated and 
developed within the same framework as Terne. Looking at the personali-
ties inside the Terne system it is likely that it has been influential in other 
political issues as well. 
The organizational effects of the Terne project must not totally over-
shadow the technological effects. The Terne weapon consisted of 
advanced computers, sonars and fuses. Both the NDRE and KY gained 
valuable experience in electronics. They acquired skills in the develop-
ment and production of servotechnical systems. 
It was mainly because of the Terne project that the R&D department of 
KY grew as fast as it did from 1958 onwards. In 1955, 2 men were 
employed in this department, in 1960 the number was 96 and four years 
later there were 150 employees in the R&D department. The Terne project 
was the most important task for this department until 1965; in 1958,1959 
and 1960 practically all the work was concentrated on Terne. 1S6 When the 
Terne project came to an end, new projects were needed. Seeing that the 
employees were experienced in the production of weapons systems it is 
obvious that they tried to find projects resembling Terne. For example, the 
R&D department worked on ten different projects in 1961, seven of which 
were military.15? 
With the benefit of hindsight it is arguable whether this concentration 
on a big, military project was good for KY. In the late 70s and throughout 
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the 80s KY had big problems, partly because of projects that were too big 
and too costly, The fact remains that almost as many as 100 engineers 
were drawn to Kongsberg in the late 50s and early 60s as a result of the 
Terne project, Most of these engineers stayed with the company when 
Terne waS finished, This growth in the staff of engineers was a major 
feature of the transition of KY from a traditional mechanical shop to an 
engineering company. 
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Sources 
This article is based on my Master Thesis presented to the University of 
Oslo in September 1988.1 would like to thank the Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies and in particular Olav Wicken whose help has been 
invaluable both in writing this article and in writing the Master Thesis. 
I have had access to the relevant files in the NDRE, in the Navy 
Headquarters, in the Ministry of Defence and at KY. Some documents 
were missing, but there does not seem to be any systematic lack of 
documents. Particularly at KV it was difficult to find documents reflecting 
strategic considerations. 
I have interviewed Finn Lied, Willy Simonsen,15B Bjame Hurlen and 
Ingjald Engelsen. 159 Some of the information acquired in these interviews 
do not correspond very well with information from the files. I have tried to 
use information from the interviews only to the extent it appears to fit with 
information given in the documents from that time. I regret that former 
Minister of Defence and deputy chairman of the board at KV, Jens 
Christian Hauge, was unwilling to answer my questions. 
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anti submarine 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
The department at the Norwegian Defence Research 
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The department at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment doing research in Physics 
The administration of the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment 
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